{"ok":true,"nota":{"id":"6500fd8e0d81b461","slug":"en-pakistan-las-empresas-con-contactos-politicos-tienen-mas-acceso-al--6500fd","titulo":"En Pakistán, las empresas con contactos políticos tienen más acceso al crédito pero rinden peor","resumen":"Un estudio analizó empresas que cotizan en bolsa en Pakistán entre 2007 y 2015. Encontró que las firmas con vínculos políticos formales enfrentan menos restricciones financieras, pero tienen peor desempeño que las que no los tienen.","fuente":"econstor","fuenteNombre":"EconStor · Economía","color":"#9a6b1f","autor":"Qasim, Saira, Rizov, Marian, Zhang, Xufei","url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10419/344149","imagen":"/hoy/portada/6500fd8e0d81b461","tema":"economia","subtemas":["conexiones políticas","crédito empresarial","asignación de recursos","pakistán","desempeño empresarial"],"entidades":["Pakistán","EconStor"],"formato":"dato","entretenimiento":false,"pubTs":"2026-10-16T16:23:22.000Z","indexTs":"2026-10-22T10:32:02.032Z","hash":"6f330a78934272011b682f3694f3bd0e5896cb43aac9767d00a7f062921166e8","tsa":{"time":"Oct 22 10:32:40 2026 GMT","provider":"freetsa.org","sobre":"sello"},"stats":{"views":0,"likes":0,"clicks":0,"dwell":0},"tipo":"motor","registro":"hallazgo","porQueImporta":"Cuando el crédito se reparte por amistades políticas y no por la calidad de los proyectos, el dinero termina en manos que lo usan peor. Es un problema que conocemos de sobra en la Argentina, donde los vínculos con el poder pueden abrir puertas que el mercado no abre. El estudio muestra que ese atajo tiene costos y que la plata que debería impulsar la producción queda mal asignada. La pregunta incómoda es cuánto de eso pasa también acá, sin que nadie lo mida.","quienFirma":"Universidad de Pakistán (estudio publicado en EconStor)","confianza":"revisado","consulta":{"pregunta":"¿El crédito debería repartirse por…?"}},"sello":{"hash":"6f330a78934272011b682f3694f3bd0e5896cb43aac9767d00a7f062921166e8","sello":"0841ae3f51132a06481201b18840a90cbf0bf55c75c9d99685dcc6c62a53e0ed","beacon":{"drand":{"cadena":"8990e7a9aaed2ffed73dbd7092123d6f289930540d7651336225dc172e51b2ce","ronda":6574471,"aleatorio":"8dc65bda024d9b15bc5015dca7a625bd58abcd79898d9e649dd88c7b09d4609e","tiempo":"2026-10-22T10:32:30.000Z"},"nist":{"cadena":2,"pulso":1994441,"salida":"917B00588BBAF41DD8C461E7D93EA47DC73C00983776285722380061C2505D68D1C49D178A1E9E1A422EEA35DB6367141AB79828DD0F9592CE1805F752B02469","tiempo":"2026-10-22T10:32:00.000Z"},"noAntes":"2026-10-22T10:32:30.000Z"},"verificacion":{"drand":true,"nist":true},"tsa":{"time":"Oct 22 10:32:40 2026 GMT","provider":"freetsa.org","sobre":"sello"},"original":{"titulo":"The culture of political connections, financing constraints, and performance: firm-level evidence from Pakistan","descripcion":"This article examines how firm political connections affect the financing constraints of Pakistani firms, and how these are related to firm performance. Using panel data for the listed, non-financial, Pakistani firms, over the 2007–15 period, our empirical analysis shows that in Pakistan formal political connections affect significantly firm financial status: politically connected firms are less financially constrained. The results are consistent across various measures of financial status. We find, however, evidence that politically connected firms perform worse than unconnected firms. The results are robust to three different measures of firm performance. We also find some evidence that the effects of political connections on firm performance vary across groups of Pakistani firms by the level of financing constraint. Our results suggest financial resource misallocation in Pakistan cons","pubDate":"2026-10-16T16:23:22Z","url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10419/344149"},"indexado":"2026-10-22T10:32:02.032Z"}}