{"ok":true,"nota":{"id":"1ab0b167a07addda","slug":"los-jugadores-de-beisbol-no-rinden-mas-en-su-ano-de-contrato-salvo-los-1ab0b1","titulo":"Los jugadores de béisbol no rinden más en su año de contrato, salvo los veteranos","resumen":"Investigadores analizaron más de tres mil temporadas de jugadores de las Grandes Ligas entre 2015 y 2025 para ver si rinden mejor cuando están por firmar un nuevo contrato. En conjunto no hubo cambios, pero los jugadores con cinco o más años de carrera sí mejoraron en su año de contrato.","fuente":"econstor","fuenteNombre":"EconStor · Economía","color":"#9a6b1f","autor":"Atkins, Matt, Dikgang, Johane","url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10419/344199","imagen":"/hoy/portada/1ab0b167a07addda","tema":"economia","subtemas":["beisbol","incentivos economicos","contratos laborales","deportes profesionales","rendimiento"],"entidades":["Major League Baseball"],"formato":"dato","entretenimiento":false,"pubTs":"2026-10-22T14:28:23.000Z","indexTs":"2026-10-22T21:54:18.824Z","hash":"7d44897922d8d42c194c1c903ff9f6e84ab4f1cc155261d92e08b02f5b1c1873","tsa":{"time":"Oct 22 21:56:26 2026 GMT","provider":"freetsa.org","sobre":"sello"},"stats":{"views":0,"likes":0,"clicks":0,"dwell":0},"tipo":"motor","registro":"hallazgo","porQueImporta":"Cuando el promedio general no muestra nada, conviene mirar a quién le pasa algo. Para los veteranos, el dinero de un contrato parece empujar el rendimiento de forma concreta, unos seis puntos en un indicador de calidad de bateo. Es una señal de que los incentivos económicos pesan más en algunos perfiles que en otros. Nadie que trabaje por un sueldo fijo debería asumir que la presión del mercado funciona igual para todos.","quienFirma":"EconStor (repositorio de trabajos económicos)","confianza":"preprint","consulta":{"pregunta":"¿El dinero de un contrato mejora el rendimiento?"}},"sello":{"hash":"7d44897922d8d42c194c1c903ff9f6e84ab4f1cc155261d92e08b02f5b1c1873","sello":"ee3bd12e8d35f1dc40252d696abf0068474f18db96bc397163f2ecb27cd8c3a3","beacon":{"drand":{"cadena":"8990e7a9aaed2ffed73dbd7092123d6f289930540d7651336225dc172e51b2ce","ronda":6575838,"aleatorio":"0a3876e39172152042339137ab5e3b393dcc0b9424256c5af20c090e9045fc73","tiempo":"2026-10-22T21:56:00.000Z"},"nist":{"cadena":2,"pulso":1995118,"salida":"F0E0C41C949133434038AD3665131BA50B8741AD6763A98DA9C9F98A82572C39F0270A26E31EB0E30B2F4719DE6ED82AA401EE3E9EB6515A5780BD147A7BE091","tiempo":"2026-10-22T21:55:00.000Z"},"noAntes":"2026-10-22T21:56:00.000Z"},"verificacion":{"drand":true,"nist":true},"tsa":{"time":"Oct 22 21:56:26 2026 GMT","provider":"freetsa.org","sobre":"sello"},"original":{"titulo":"The Contract Year Phenomenon Revisited: Heterogeneous Performance Responses in Major League Baseball","descripcion":"This study re-examines whether the performance of Major League Baseball batters changes in contract years. Using a panel of 3,654 player-season observations covering 1,003 players from 2015 to 2025, we estimate two-way fixed effects models with expected weighted on-base average (xwOBA) as the primary measure of performance. Pooled across all players, the contract-year coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero and is equivalent to zero within economically meaningful bounds. Disaggregating by career stage, however, reveals substantial heterogeneity: players with five or more years of major league service post xwOBA approximately six points higher in contract years, whereas players further from eligibility show no response (.. = .004 for the difference). Among veterans, the response is localized to the contract year rather than adjacent seasons, survives survivorship and sele","pubDate":"2026-10-22T14:28:23Z","url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10419/344199"},"indexado":"2026-10-22T21:54:18.824Z"}}